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A JUDGE’S DUTY TO DO JUSTICE:
ENSURING THE ACCUSED’S RIGHT TO THE
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Peter A. Joy*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Every judge takes an oath, similar to the oath federal judges take, to
“administer justice” and to “do equal right to the poor and to the rich.”1
In addition, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, which states have adopted,2 requires a judge to
“accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding . . . the
right to be heard according to law.”3 While a judge’s oath and the Code
of Judicial Conduct provide some general guidance about a judge’s duty
to do justice, the ABA Criminal Justice Standards Regarding Special
Functions of the Trial Judge provide more specific guidance about what
it means to “administer justice” by stating “[t]he trial judge has the
* Henry Hitchcock Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law.
For very helpful comments and suggestions to an early draft of this Article, I thank the participants
at the 2017 Criminal Justice Ethics Schmooze primarily hosted by New York Law School: Sanjay
Chhablani, Andrew Davies, Bennett Gershman, Cynthia Godsoe, Bruce Green, Carissa Hessick,
Jennifer Laurin, Tamara Lave, Samuel Levine, Janet Moore, Anna Offit, Lauren Ouziel, Anna
Roberts, Jenny Roberts, Rebecca Roiphe, Maybell Romero, Jessica Roth, and Ellen Yaroshefsky.
I also thank Katy Mason, Washington University Law, 2017, for her valuable research.
1. The oath for justices and judges in the federal court system states: “I, ___ ___, do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal
right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all
the duties incumbent upon me as ___ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help
me God.” 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2012). “Each state has a similar oath.” Mary Sue Backus, The Adversary
System Is Dead; Long Live the Adversary System: The Trial Judge as the Great Equalizer in
Criminal Trials, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 945, 967 & n.122 (commenting on the federal oath and
citing to several state oaths).
2. As of August 22, 2016, thirty-five states have adopted amendments to their codes of
judicial ethics based on the 2007 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct. See Chronological List of States
Adopting Amendments Based upon the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/chronolog
ical_status_judicial_code.authcheckdam.pdf (last updated Aug. 22, 2016).
3. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007).
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responsibility for safeguarding both the rights of the accused and the
interests of the public in the administration of criminal justice.”4 The
ABA Criminal Justice Standards further explain this duty: “The
adversary nature of the proceedings does not relieve the trial judge of the
obligation of raising on his or her initiative, at all appropriate times and
in an appropriate manner, matters which may significantly promote a
just determination of the trial.”5
When a judge’s oath to administer justice is read together with a
judge’s ethical obligations and ABA Criminal Justice Standards’
guidance concerning the responsibility of a trial judge to safeguard the
rights of the accused, these admonitions inform every trial judge that she
has an affirmative obligation to see that justice is done. A trial judge
“does not serve his purpose or function by being merely an umpire, a
referee, a symbol, or an ornament.”6 Rather, “legal discretion has been
vested in the trial judge to do or cause to be done . . . all things
reasonably necessary as the particular cause requires to promote the ends
of justice.”7
In criminal cases, a judge’s duty to do justice must include ensuring
that the accused has a meaningful Sixth Amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel,8 because effective legal representation is
essential to a fair trial.9 As the Supreme Court has stated: “Without
counsel, the right to a trial itself would be ‘of little avail,’”10 and “the
right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”11
If both substantive and procedural justice are the objectives of our
criminal justice system, a judge who fails to ensure effective assistance
of counsel is actually a negative actor working against the interests of
justice and the rights of the accused.12 Judge William W. Schwarzer, at
4. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE Standard
6-1.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2000).
5. Id.
6. Alfred Gitelson & Bruce L. Gitelson, A Trial Judge’s Credo Must Include His Affirmative
Duty to Be an Instrumentality of Justice, 7 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 7, 8 (1966). Lara Bazelon has
argued that this duty to do justice includes using shaming sanctions against prosecutors during oral
arguments in wrongful conviction cases to correct miscarriages of justice. Lara Bazelon,
For Shame: The Public Humiliation of Prosecutors by Judges to Correct Wrongful Convictions,
29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 305, 351-52 (2016).
7. Gitelson & Gitelson, supra note 6, at 9.
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that “in our adversary system of criminal justice, any
person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him.” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
10. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 69 (1932)).
11. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
12. “The objective and sole justification of our law and courts being justice, a trial judge
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the time a federal district court judge, maintained that when a defense
lawyer’s ineffectiveness prejudices the accused’s rights, “the adversary
process has effectively ceased to function,”13 and the judge’s
responsibility for the administration of justice means that a judge
“cannot be indifferent to events which diminish the quality of justice in
his court.”14
In McMann v. Richardson, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized this
duty to justice and the need for trial judges to ensure effective assistance
of counsel:
[W]e think the matter [as to whether defense counsel is providing
adequate representation], for the most part, should be left to the good
sense and discretion of the trial courts with the admonition that if the
right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose,
defendants cannot be left to the mercies of the incompetent counsel,
and that judges should strive to maintain proper standards of
performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in criminal
cases in their courts.15

Several other federal and state courts have similarly recognized that
in the face of ineffective assistance of counsel, trial judges have an
obligation to protect the rights of accused and not sit by idly.16
In reality, though, too many judges abdicate their duty to administer
and do justice by failing to ensure that trial counsel is providing effective
assistance of counsel.17 This occurs when a trial judge fails to give
proper attention to the issue of a defense lawyer’s ineffectiveness
whether raised by the defendant, a defense counsel overburdened by
heavy caseloads, or through the judge’s own observations and
experiences with the lawyer’s objectively unreasonable performance.18
By neglecting instances of ineffective assistance of counsel at the
trial level,19 the issue of possible Sixth Amendment violations of the
cannot be negative.” Gitelson & Gitelson, supra note 6, at 8.
13. William W. Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel—The Trial Judge’s Role, 93
HARV. L. REV. 633, 637 (1980).
14. Id. at 638.
15. McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 (emphasis added).
16. See Schwarzer, supra note 13, at 641 n.42 (citing several federal and state trial court and
court of appeals decisions).
17. See id. at 637-38.
18. See David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 6, 17
(1973); see also Schwarzer, supra note 13, at 634 (“[S]urveys indicate that judges rate the overall
performance of around one-tenth of the lawyers appearing before them as less than adequate and
prejudicial to their client’s cause. . . . Because of the pressures of staggering case loads and limited
resources, the criminal justice system frequently produces marginal performances by counsel.”
(footnote omitted)).
19. The phrases “trial level” or “trial” in this Article refer not just to the trial itself but to all
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right to counsel is left to courts through post-conviction proceedings. As
I will discuss later, these post-conviction proceedings into ineffective
assistance of counsel claims routinely excuse objectively substandard
legal representation because of the requirement that the defendant must
also prove prejudice.20 As a result, we have a criminal justice system that
officially excuses substandard legal representation in criminal cases
when defense lawyers are ineffective because trial judges often do not
ensure the rights of the accused.
In this Article, I contend that a trial judge needs to be committed to
a duty to do justice by ensuring the accused’s right to effective
assistance of counsel. Instead of continuing to pigeon-hole ineffective
assistance of counsel claims as a post-trial inquiry, there are some
circumstances when a trial judge’s duty to do justice requires an inquiry
into whether defense counsel is providing effective assistance of counsel
at the trial level. Part II analyzes resistance to recognizing ineffective
assistance of counsel at the trial level and in post-conviction
proceedings.21 Part III examines the crisis in public defense and how
case overloads and funding practices for public defense create
disincentives to effective assistance of counsel.22 Then, Part IV analyzes
how the rights of the accused differ when the accused has a publicly
provided lawyer compared to privately retained counsel.23 Part V
describes the situations that trigger a trial judge’s duty to conduct an
effective assistance of counsel hearing,24 and Part VI recommends both
the type of hearing and the standard the judge should apply in evaluating
counsel’s effectiveness.25 Part VII concludes by arguing that to do
justice a trial judge must ensure the accused’s right to the effective
assistance of counsel.26

proceedings at the trial level, which include pretrial proceedings and defense preparations for trial or
a plea. Pretrial proceedings and defense preparations include, but are not limited to: meeting with
the client and communicating with the client regularly; investigating the case, including
interviewing potential witnesses; conducting discovery; and researching applicable law to the
offenses charged and possible defenses. As noted, trial level includes pleas, which are extremely
important, because “criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of
trials. Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are
the result of guilty pleas.” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012).
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
25. See infra Part VI.
26. See infra Part VII.
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II. RESISTANCE TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL:
TURNING A BLIND EYE
Trial judges are often passive and either assume that the accused’s
lawyer is providing effective assistance of counsel, or simply do nothing
in the face of obvious substandard representation. A few examples
demonstrate that even when a trial judge faces obviously unprepared or
inept defense counsel, some trial judges will not act to ensure that the
defendant has effective assistance of counsel.27
For example, James Fisher was convicted of first-degree murder
and sentenced to death in Oklahoma.28 The trial transcript shows that his
court-appointed lawyer, E. Melvin Porter, had failed to conduct
discovery prior to trial,29 was ill-prepared,30 inept, and disloyal to his
client.31 After reviewing the trial transcript, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated:
[T]he nature of the trial itself indicates a singular lack of preparation
on Mr. Porter’s part. The trial transcript reveals that throughout most
of Mr. Porter’s examination of witnesses, including his own client, he
had no idea what answers he would receive to his questions and was
not pursuing any particular strategy of defense. 32

The trial transcript also demonstrated that the defense lawyer “exhibited
hostility to his client and sympathy and agreement with the prosecution
in ways that put his actions directly at odds with his client’s interests.”33
The Tenth Circuit’s review of the trial record convinced it “beyond
question that Mr. Porter’s representation . . . was not objectively
reasonable.”34 Although there were ample examples of poor defense
lawyer performance in the trial record,35 the trial judge did nothing to
promote justice by protecting the defendant’s right to effective
assistance of counsel by intervening in some way when it was apparent,
from the start of the trial, that Fisher’s court-appointed lawyer was
not prepared.36
27. See infra notes 28-46 and accompanying text.
28. Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283, 1287 (10th Cir. 2002).
29. Id. at 1297.
30. Id. at 1293-96. The state made certain items and officers who would testify available to
the defense, but at the trial the defense attorney’s lack of preparation was disclosed. Id. at 1293 n.5.
31. Id. at 1298.
32. Id. at 1294.
33. Id. at 1298.
34. Id. at 1293.
35. See, e.g., id. at 1295 (discussing defense counsel’s failure to mitigate impact of damaging
testimony).
36. At trial, Fisher’s lawyer, Porter, claimed that he was unaware that a police officer was
going to testify to incriminating statements made by Fisher and objected to the testimony, claiming
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Another example is the case of Moises Catalan, who, along with his
brother, was convicted of aggravated assault in Texas.37 Catalan and his
brother originally had the same lawyer, Joe Montemayor, but on the day
the case was set for trial, the judge appointed Catalan a new lawyer,
Thomas Grett, due to the conflict presented by Montemayor’s joint
representation of Catalan and his brother.38 Grett did not seek to
continue the trial, but rather consulted with Catalan and Montemayor for
less than an hour, did no investigation, and relied on the decisions of
Catalan’s brother’s lawyer, Montemayor, during the trial.39 In reviewing
the trial record, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that Grett had
failed to request time to prepare for the case, which was guaranteed by
statute to be at least ten days,40 and Grett was therefore unable to
introduce evidence favorable to Catalan.41 The Fifth Circuit stated,
“Because of his reliance and ignorance of the facts of the case, Grett did
not impeach the victim on cross examination with prior inconsistent
testimony that Catalan was a mere bystander to the assault.”42 Even
more important to the finding of ineffectiveness was Grett’s reliance on
Montemayor, whose conflict of interest had triggered his removal from
representing Catalan.43 The Texas state court denied Catalan postconviction relief,44 but the Fifth Circuit affirmed the federal district court
granting Catalan relief, finding it “a clear case of deficient performance
and prejudice.”45 Given the circumstances of the trial, a reasonable
person could conclude that a trial judge committed to protecting the
rights of Catalan would not have permitted the trial to go forward
in the first place when Grett was so unprepared and unfamiliar with his
client’s case.46
Typically, a lawyer’s poor performance at trial is overlooked on
appeal as well due to the difficult standard of review. When the U.S.

the state had failed to provide notice of the testimony. Id. at 1293 n.5. The state responded that
Porter had been advised that he could review a videotape of Fisher’s interrogation and interview the
officers, and Porter failed to do so. Id. The court overruled Porter’s objection, ruling that Porter had
adequate notice of the testimony. Id. This interchange should have flagged for the trial judge that
Porter had neither done thorough discovery nor had adequately prepared for the trial.
37. Catalan v. Cockrell, 315 F.3d 491, 492 (5th Cir. 2002).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 492 & n.1.
41. Id. at 492-93.
42. Id. at 492.
43. Id. at 492-93.
44. Id. at 492.
45. Id. at 493.
46. See id. at 492-93.
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Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright,47 which established the
right to defense counsel in criminal cases when one is unable to pay for a
lawyer,48 most federal and state courts required that before a postconviction finding of ineffective assistance of counsel, a lawyer’s
performance would have to be so deficient that “the circumstances
surrounding the trial shocked the conscience of the court and made the
proceedings a farce and a mockery of justice.”49 This “farce or mockery”
standard not only imposed a very heavy burden on defendants, its
vagueness meant that courts applied it inconsistently and relied almost
wholly on the reviewing courts’ subjective determinations.50 During the
era that this standard prevailed, Chief Judge David Bazelon of the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the standard “is
itself a mockery of the sixth amendment.”51
In Strickland v. Washington,52 the Supreme Court moved away
from the farce and mockery standard and held that an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim requires the defendant to prove both
objectively unreasonable performance by the lawyer and prejudice.53
The Court proceeded to define prejudice as a reasonable probability
that the lawyer’s inadequate performance adversely affected the
outcome of the case.54 In other words, but for the defense lawyer’s
poor representation, it is likely that the defendant would not have
been convicted.
In considering the lawyer’s performance, the Court stated it is
“highly deferential” to defense counsel.55 In cases subsequent to
Strickland, the Court has stated that “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high
47. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
48. Gideon established the right for the defendant facing felony charges in state court to have
counsel provided when the defendant is unable to hire his or her own lawyer. See id. at 342-44.
After Gideon, a series of Supreme Court decisions expanded the right to counsel for the poor.
See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (recognizing right to counsel in probation
revocation matters where incarceration is possible); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972)
(recognizing the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases where incarceration is possible); In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967) (extending the right to counsel to juvenile matters); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1963) (providing right to counsel in the first state appeal as a matter of right).
49. Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 889 (1945); see Maryland v. Marzullo, 435 U.S. 1011, 1011 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)
(citing cases using a “farce” or “mockery” of justice standard). Courts sometimes characterized the
standard as a “farce and mockery of justice” standard. See, e.g., Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d
149, 151 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing cases from all circuits adopting the “farce and mockery” standard).
50. Mark R. Lee, Right to Effective Counsel: A Judicial Heuristic, 2 AM. J. CRIM. L. 277, 289
(1974).
51. Bazelon, supra note 18, at 28.
52. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
53. Id. at 687-88, 691-92.
54. Id. at 687, 694.
55. Id. at 689-90.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 9

146

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:139

bar is never an easy task.”56 Combining a highly deferential view of
defense counsel’s performance with the almost impossible prejudice
standard results in some courts rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel
claims even in capital cases where defense counsel has slept through
portions of the trial,57 or have been under the influence of alcohol, drugs,
or otherwise mentally impaired at trial.58
The high bar Strickland sets is compounded by the very fact that a
post-trial review of defense counsel’s effectiveness is extremely difficult
because one does not know how the trial would have proceeded if
counsel had performed better.59 In his dissent in Strickland, Justice
Thurgood Marshall predicted:
[I]t it may be impossible for a reviewing court to confidently ascertain
how the government’s evidence and arguments would have stood up
against rebuttal and cross-examination by a shrewd, well-prepared
lawyer. . . . [E]vidence of injury to the defendant may be missing from
the record precisely because of the incompetence of defense counsel. 60

Justice Marshall’s prediction has proven true, and few defendants
prevail with ineffective assistance of counsel claims due to the almost
impossibly high Strickland standard.61 In rejecting an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim in a death penalty case, one appellate judge
observed: “[T]he Constitution, as interpreted by the courts, does not
require that the accused, even in a capital case, be represented by able or
effective counsel. It requires representation only by a lawyer who is not
ineffective under the standard set by Strickland v. Washington.”62 The
Judge stated that because of the Strickland standard, “accused persons
who are represented by ‘not-legally-ineffective’ lawyers may be
condemned to die when the same accused, if represented by effective
counsel, would receive at least the clemency of a life sentence.”63
56. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
57. See, e.g., Ex parte McFarland, 163 S.W.3d 743, 748-49, 751-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)
(en banc) (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claims including defense counsel sleeping
during trial).
58. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to
Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425,
455-60 (1996) (describing cases in which courts reject ineffective assistance of counsel claims when
lawyers use drugs, alcohol, or are otherwise mentally impaired at trial).
59. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance
After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2169-71 (2013) (describing how courts
repeatedly excuse poor lawyering by presuming the lawyers were making strategic decisions or by
not finding prejudice).
62. Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., concurring).
63. Id. The Strickland standard has the perverse effect of requiring courts to affirm
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Donald Dripps has argued that due to the difficulty in meeting the
Strickland standard for an ex post examination of defense counsel’s
effectiveness, trial courts should conduct “an ex ante inquiry into
whether the defense is institutionally equipped to litigate as effectively
as the prosecution.”64 Dripps calls this “an ex ante parity standard,”
and he suggests that it occur either in collateral civil proceedings
challenging the effectiveness of the defense system as a whole, or in
individual cases upon a pretrial motion asserting that the defendant
cannot receive effective assistance of counsel due to deficiencies in the
indigent defense system.65 I agree that this is an alternative solution to
the problem of the crisis in the public defense system, which I discuss
in Part III of this Article.66
III. THE CRISIS IN PUBLIC DEFENSE: CASE OVERLOADS AND
DISINCENTIVES TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Instead of continuing to relegate ineffective assistance of counsel
claims to a post-trial inquiry only, there are circumstances when a trial
judge’s duty to justice requires an inquiry into whether defense counsel
is providing effective assistance of counsel.67 This is especially
necessary when defense counsel is laboring under excessive caseloads
and with few resources to provide effective assistance of counsel, and
instead “practice triage as they attempt to represent more people than is
humanly – and ethically – possible.”68
If the defense lawyer is a public defender, it is likely that she will
have a caseload that far exceeds recommended caseload standards.69 The
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice cite to a maximum annual caseload
of 150 felonies, or 400 misdemeanors, or 200 juvenile cases, or 200
mental commitments, or 25 appeals per attorney.70 In courts across the
United States, most defendants are represented by public defenders with
convictions when the legal representation was objectively ineffective but not “ineffective” as a
matter of law.
64. Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity
Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 243 (1997).
65. Id. at 286-306.
66. See infra Part III.
67. See Dripps, supra note 64, at 277-78.
68. Bright & Sanneh, supra note 61, at 2152.
69. See Dripps, supra note 64, at 249.
70. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-5.3
cmt. at 72 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1992). The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice refer to the caseload
standards first developed by the National Advisory Committee in 1973 as “hav[ing] proven resilient
over time, and provid[ing] a rough measure of caseloads.” Id.; National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, The Defense (Black Letter), NLADA, http://www.nlada.org/
defender-standards/national-advisory-commission/black-letter (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
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caseloads that are double or triple the recommended levels.71 The high
caseloads likely lead some public defenders to cut corners such as failing
to investigate the facts and law of their cases thoroughly, foregoing
filing important pretrial motions, neglecting to explain collateral
consequences of conviction to clients considering plea bargains, and
failing to prepare adequately for trials.72
Disincentives to rendering effective assistance of counsel also
plague public defense when there are appointed counsel who receive
unrealistically low pay rates or provide public defense through low-bid
or flat-rate public defense contracts.73 Some lawyers taking public
defense cases with low hourly rates or flat fees “are prioritizing speed
in order to make representation more profitable,” which includes
“clients pleading to the offense charged.”74 As a result, low pay for
appointed counsel and low-bid public defense contracts often lead to
poor representation.75
71. Hearings and studies reveal that these caseload limits are exceeded in almost every
jurisdiction. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING
QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 18 (2004), http://texaswcl.tamu.edu/reports/2004_ABA_Gideon%27s_
Broken_Promise.pdf [hereinafter GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE] (reporting that testimony at ABA
hearings demonstrated public defender caseloads in several states exceeded maximum caseload
guidelines by more than 150%). The Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics found that
approximately seventy-three percent of county-based public defender offices exceed caseload
guidelines per attorney in 2007. DONALD J. FAROLE, JR. & LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF STATISTICS, COUNTY-BASED AND LOCAL PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007, at 1
(2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/clpdo07.pdf; see also NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL
COMM., CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 68 & n.113 (2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/
pdf/139.pdf (finding six attorneys handled over 10,000 misdemeanor cases in Tennessee in 2006,
and the average caseload for public defenders in Dade County, Florida was nearly 500 felonies and
2225 misdemeanors per lawyer in 2008).
72. See Peter A. Joy, Ensuring the Ethical Representation of Clients in the Face of Excessive
Caseloads, 75 MO. L. REV. 771, 779 (2010).
73. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 71, at 12, 18.
74. SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR., JUSTICE SHORTCHANGED: ASSIGNED COUNSEL
COMPENSATION IN WISCONSIN 17 (2015), http://sixthamendment.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/
04/6AC_wijusticeshortchanged_2015.pdf.
75. Wisconsin’s hourly rate of forty dollars for appointed counsel and fixed-fee contracts for
some public defense compromise the quality of legal assistance defendants receive. Id. at 5-13.
Some states have prohibited low pay for appointed counsel and fixed fees contracting because they
create financial conflicts of interest. Id. at 13. For example, the Idaho law that provides public
defense contains a provision that prohibits contracts that “include any pricing structure that charges
or pays a single fixed fee for the services and expenses of the attorney.” IDAHO CODE § 19-859(4)
(2014). A Michigan law establishes minimum standards to guarantee the right to counsel which
states, in pertinent part, that “[e]conomic disincentives or incentives that impair defense counsel’s
ability to provide effective representation shall be avoided.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.991(2)(b)
(2017). Ineffective assistance of counsel can also occur with privately retained defense counsel who
are not sufficiently experienced, or who are only prepared to seek a plea bargain, sometimes to the
offense charged, with little or no investigation and will not go to trial in the interest of maximizing
the value of the fee they charged their clients. See Albert W. Alschuler, Personal Failure,
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The problems with, and poor quality of, public defense are
generally recognized,76 even by top law enforcement officials. Former
Attorney General Eric Holder observed:
As we all know, public defender programs are too many times underfunded. Too often, defenders carry huge caseloads that make it
difficult, if not impossible, for them to fulfill their legal and ethical
responsibilities to their clients. Lawyers buried under these caseloads
often can’t interview their clients properly, file appropriate motions,
conduct fact investigations, or spare the time needed to ask and apply
for additional grant funding.77

The substandard lawyering taking place raises legal issues about the
de facto denial of the right to counsel, and triggers concerns about
judges and publicly provided lawyers abdicating their ethical
responsibilities to the accused. It also raises questions about what
responsibility a trial judge has, or should have, to ensure that the accused
has competent representation.
As Stephen Bright and Sian Sanneh have observed, in state and
local courts responsible for over ninety-five percent of all criminal
prosecutions,78 “[t]he right to counsel is not enforced. Many judges
tolerate or welcome inadequate representation because it allows them to
process cases quickly.”79 Underlying this indifference to, if not a
preference for, inadequate representation is a widespread belief among
judges “that most criminal defendants are guilty anyway” resulting in a
“‘guilty anyway’ syndrome.”80 Contrary to this “guilty anyway
syndrome,” there have been 350 DNA exonerations in the United States
since 1989, which conclusively demonstrate guilt should not be

Institutional Failure, and the Sixth Amendment, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 149, 150
(1986). More than thirty years ago, Albert Alschuler explained the practice of some defense lawyers
who, once a fee is collected in advance, find “[their] economic interests lie in disposing of the case
as rapidly as possible” which “is usually to enter a bargained plea.” Id.
76. Substandard legal representation springs from excessive caseloads, lack of funds for
expert witnesses and investigators, and low pay rates for court-appointed lawyers and contract
defense services; these problems are well-documented. See Norman Lefstein & Georgia Vagenas,
Restraining Excessive Defender Caseloads: The ABA Ethics Committee Requires Action,
CHAMPION, Dec. 2006, at 10, 10-11; James M. McCauley, Excessive Workloads Create Ethical
Issues for Court-Appointed Counsel and Public Defenders, VA. LAW., Oct. 2004, at 2, 2-4. See
generally NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., supra note 71.
77. Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Address at the Department of Justice National Symposium
on Indigent Defense: Looking Back, Looking Forward, 2000–2010 (Feb. 18, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-addresses-department-justicenational-symposium-indigent.
78. Bright & Sanneh, supra note 61, at 2153.
79. Id. at 2154.
80. Bazelon, supra note 18, at 26.
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assumed, even after conviction, in every case.81 When exonerations for
all reasons, including DNA exonerations, are considered, there are more
than 2120 documented cases of persons wrongfully convicted since
1989.82 Rather than failing to take the accused’s right to truly adequate
and effective assistance of counsel, trial judges should recognize that
they have an affirmative duty to do justice by assuring the accused’s
rights. This is especially necessary when the defendant is indigent and
has no choice of counsel, as is discussed in the next Part.83
IV. HOW THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED DIFFER:
PUBLIC DEFENSE VERSUS PRIVATELY RETAINED COUNSEL
A. The Hobson’s Choice Facing Indigent Defendants
Imagine a defendant facing charges for grand theft. At arraignment,
the trial judge appoints a public defender to represent him. Well before
the trial date, the defendant requests that he be permitted to represent
himself because he believes his appointed public defender has too many
other cases. Initially, the trial judge rules that the defendant may proceed
pro se, but later reverses this ruling and appoints the same public
defender. The judge also denies the defendant’s repeated requests for the
appointment of a lawyer other than the overburdened public defender. At
trial, the judge requires the public defender to conduct the defense. The
jury finds the defendant guilty as charged, and the judge sentences him
to prison. The defendant appeals through the state court system, and both
the court of appeals and state supreme court affirm that the defendant
had no federal or state constitutional right to represent himself. The
Supreme Court grants certiorari and rules that there is a constitutional
right to conduct one’s own defense.
The defendant was Anthony Faretta, and the Supreme Court case
recognizing that the Sixth Amendment contains the right of selfrepresentation is Faretta v. California.84 Imbedded in the Faretta
decision, though, is the Hobson’s choice Anthony Faretta faced: accept
an overburdened and ineffective lawyer or argue for the right of self-

81. DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocence
project.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
82. See Exonerations by State, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu
/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonerations-in-the-United-States-Map.aspx (last visited Nov. 15,
2017).
83. See infra Part IV.
84. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818-19 (1975).
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representation.85 When questioned by the judge about why he wanted to
represent himself, Faretta stated that “he did not want to be represented
by the public defender because he believed that the office was ‘very
loaded down with . . . a heavy case load.’”86 In other words, Faretta
believed that the public defender’s heavy caseload meant that he would
not receive adequate representation and that he would be better off
representing himself.87 After the trial court imposed the public defender
on him the second time, Faretta moved three times for the court to
appoint a lawyer other than the overburdened public defender, and each
time the court denied his motions.88
Law students learn that Faretta stands for the proposition that the
Sixth Amendment includes the right of self-representation, but it stands
for something more. Faretta also stands for the proposition that if an
indigent defendant raises concerns about the quality of his government
provided lawyer with the court, the trial judge may give the defendant
the same Hobson’s choice Faretta was given: accept your appointed
defense counsel no matter how overburdened or inadequate the lawyer
may be, or effectively waive your Sixth Amendment right to counsel and
assert your right to proceed pro se.89 This choice can, and often does,
mask the fact that the trial judge who does not examine the defendant’s
claims concerning the quality of defense counsel carefully is failing to
ensure that the indigent defendant receives effective assistance of
counsel guaranteed by Gideon.
B. The Unrestricted Choice for Defendants Who Can Pay
Now, imagine a defendant facing charges for conspiring to
distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana. His family hires an
attorney to represent him. After his arraignment, the defendant calls a
second attorney in another state because of that attorney’s reputation for
being aggressive and successful. The defendant meets with the second
85. See id. at 807-08.
86. Id. at 807 (alteration in original).
87. Other commentators have read Faretta’s concern about his public defender’s heavy
caseload to mean that Faretta feared that he would not receive adequate representation. See, e.g.,
Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the Pro Se
Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 432 (2007) (“Anthony Faretta thought his court-appointed
public defender was ‘too loaded down with . . . a heavy case load’ to represent him adequately, so
he requested permission to represent himself.” (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807)); Janet Moore,
The Antidemocratic Sixth Amendment, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1705, 1733-34 (2016) (noting that
“Faretta wanted a government-paid lawyer” but not one “who he alleged was overworked, biased,
and conflicted” (footnote omitted)).
88. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 810 & n.5.
89. See Hashimoto, supra note 87, at 465 & n.152.
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attorney, hires him, and the second attorney initially works with the first
lawyer in representing the defendant. The defendant then fires his first
lawyer, and the second lawyer, who is from out of state, files a motion
with the court for admission pro hac vice (temporary admission) to
represent the defendant. The trial judge denies the motion without
comment. A month later, the second lawyer again files a motion for
admission pro hac vice to represent the defendant, and the trial judge
again denies the motion without comment. The defendant’s first lawyer
withdraws from representing the defendant, and the defendant hires
another lawyer already admitted to practice before the court. On the first
day of trial, defendant’s chosen lawyer, the second lawyer, again seeks
admission to represent the defendant and the trial court denies his third
request. The trial judge also prohibits the second lawyer from assisting
the defendant’s more recently retained lawyer during the trial. Defendant
is convicted, he appeals, and the court of appeals reverses his conviction
holding: “A non-indigent criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights
encompass the right to be represented by the attorney selected by the
defendant.”90 The Court grants the government’s certiorari request, and
the Court affirms the court of appeals and rules in favor of the defendant.
The defendant was Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez, and the Supreme
Court case recognizing that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to
hire counsel of one’s choice is United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez.91 In
affirming the Eighth Circuit’s decision to reverse Gonzalez-Lopez’s
conviction, the Court explained that the right to hire counsel of one’s
choice is “regarded as the root meaning of the [Sixth Amendment’s]
constitutional guarantee.”92 The Court additionally held that if the Sixth
Amendment right to hire counsel of one’s choice is denied erroneously,
no showing of prejudice is required to trigger reversal even if the
defendant has been ably represented at trial.93 In other words, the twopart Strickland test for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims
is not applicable, and the issue is viewed similar to a complete denial of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.94

90.
(2006).
91.
92.
93.
94.

United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 399 F.3d 924, 928 (8th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 548 U.S. 140
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 144, 147-48.
Id. at 147-48.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 146-48.
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C. Differences in the Right to Counsel Based on Ability to Pay
Legal rights in the United States often depend upon the amount of
money one has,95 and Gonzalez-Lopez and Faretta demonstrate that
this is especially true when it comes to the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.96 In contrast to the limited rights of indigent defendants who
must accept the lawyer assigned to them, defendants who can retain
defense counsel have more expansive rights. 97 When the accused can
pay, the U.S. Supreme Court protects one’s right to choose her own
lawyer, and instructs the trial judge that denying the defendant’s right
to counsel of choice is reversible error even if another lawyer provided
effective representation to the defendant: “Where the right to be
assisted by counsel of one’s choice is wrongfully denied, therefore, it
is unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or prejudice inquiry to
establish a Sixth Amendment violation.”98 Such a denial results in
structural error, which not only relieves the defendant of the burden of
proving ineffectiveness of the lawyer who represented him but also is
not subject to harmless-error analysis.99

95. “[M]ore than 80 percent of the civil legal needs of the poor go unmet,” and approximately
“61 percent of the legal needs of middle-income households” go unmet because of the inability to
find affordable lawyers. Peter A. Joy, Rationing Justice by Rationing Lawyers, 37 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 205, 205 & n.2 (2011). Having a lawyer dramatically increases a person’s ability to assert
and succeed in pressing legal claims. See, e.g., Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to
Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 37, 46-66 (2010) (finding that having a lawyer increased success rates in asserting legal claims).
Due to the inability to afford lawyers, one or both parties in more than two-thirds of civil cases
represent themselves. Martha Bergmark, We Don’t Need Fewer Lawyers. We Need Cheaper Ones.,
WASH. POST (June 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/06/02/wedont-need-fewer-lawyers-we-need-cheaper-ones/?utm_term=.63e62048753d. “Many people suffer
crushing losses in court not because they’ve done something wrong, but simply because they don’t
have legal help.” Id.
In Powell v. Alabama, the Court recognized the critical importance of defense counsel in
criminal cases and explained:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science
of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. . . . He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense,
even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step
in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger
of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of
men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of
feeble intellect.
287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
96. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807-08 (1975).
97. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 144.
98. Id. at 148-51.
99. Id. at 150-52.
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Courts privilege defendants with the ability to retain counsel in
additional ways. When a defendant who has retained counsel is
unhappy with her lawyer’s performance, the defendant is able to fire
her first lawyer and hire a new lawyer without the court’s approval as
long as the new lawyer is admitted to practice before the court and the
change in lawyers will not cause a delay. 100 If a defendant who has
retained counsel experiences a breakdown in the relationship and a loss
of trust, the defendant is able to hire a new lawyer that she can trust
without any court intrusion.101
The opposite is true if the defendant is among the approximately
eighty percent of criminal defendants who must rely upon public
defenders or other assigned counsel for legal representation. 102 If an
indigent defendant is unhappy with defense counsel provided by the
government, usually there is little recourse.103 When defense counsel
and an indigent defendant are at odds and there is a breakdown in the
basic client-attorney relationship, the Court has stated that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel does not guarantee a meaningful
relationship between the accused and counsel. 104 Additionally, the
Court has stated that an indigent defendant cannot “insist on
representation by a person who is not a member of the bar, or demand
that a court honor his waiver of conflict-free representation.”105 The

100. See id. at 151-52.
101. A defendant may replace retained counsel without a judge interfering in the decision as
long as the lawyer is admitted to practice before the court, or capable of being admitted to practice,
and hiring a new lawyer does not delay the trial. See id.
102. This estimate is based upon a study that found public defenders and assigned counsel
representing 82% and 15% respectively, of state felony cases in the 100 most populous counties in
the United States. See CAROL J. DEFRANCES & MARIKA F.X. LITRAS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1999, at 1
(2000), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/idslc99.pdf. The 100 most populous counties
accounted for 42% of the U.S. population in 1999. Id. at 2. A report released in 2000 states that
approximately 66% of defendants in federal felony cases were represented by public defenders or
assigned counsel. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/clpdo07.pdf. “Approximately 95% of criminal defendants are charged in State courts, with
the remainder tried in Federal courts.” Id. at 4.
103. If the defendant is represented by a public defender, the public defender service may
consider a request to provide a substitute public defender if there is a breakdown in the relationship
between the defendant and the original public defender. If the public defender service does not
provide substitute counsel, the defendant either accepts the originally assigned lawyer or must ask
the trial judge to provide substitute counsel. This is because the Court has held that there is no Sixth
Amendment guarantee to a “‘meaningful relationship’ between an accused and his counsel,” Morris
v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983), and “the trial court . . . has almost complete discretion regarding
whether to grant a request for new counsel,” Hashimoto, supra note 87, at 465 n.152.
104. Morris, 461 U.S. at 13-14.
105. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152.
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defendant may ask for substitute counsel, but the Court has stated that
“a defendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot
afford.”106 If the trial judge denies the request for new counsel, the
indigent defendant is usually in a take it or leave it situation, like
Anthony Faretta, when it comes to defense counsel—take the defense
lawyer you have and go to trial, or give up your right to counsel and
represent yourself.
V. THE DUTY TO CONDUCT AN EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL HEARING
The right to the effective assistance of counsel is the cornerstone of
a fair and just criminal trial or plea, and necessary for the accused to
receive due process. Thus, a trial judge has an obligation, even on her
own initiative, to inquire into the effectiveness of defense counsel when
there is reason to do so.107 The fact that a criminal trial is an adversary
proceeding does not relieve the trial judge of this obligation.108 A trial
judge cannot be an effective arbiter of the trial process if the trial or plea
itself is not fair due to the ineffectiveness of counsel.109
There are three distinct, but at times overlapping, situations that
should prompt a trial judge to conduct a pre-trial inquiry into whether
counsel for the accused is providing effective assistance of counsel.110
First, and foremost, a pre-trial inquiry should be triggered whenever the
defendant requests substitute counsel and complains to the court about
defense counsel.111 Second, a pretrial inquiry should be required
whenever caseloads of defense counsel are so excessive that the caseload
undermines defense counsel’s ability to provide effective assistance of
counsel to the accused.112 This may be triggered either by defense
counsel raising the issue, or when the issue of excessive caseloads in a
jurisdiction is otherwise known to the trial judge.113 Third, there may be
times when defense counsel performance appears to be so deficient that

106. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988); see Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 151
(“[T]he right to counsel of choice does not extend to defendants who require counsel to be
appointed for them.”); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989)
(stating that a defendant who cannot afford to hire counsel is only guaranteed adequate
representation).
107. See supra Part IV.A.
108. See supra notes 4-15 and accompanying text.
109. See Schwarzer, supra note 13, at 641.
110. See infra Part V.A–C.
111. See infra Part V.A.
112. See infra Part V.B.
113. See infra Part V.B.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 9

156

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:139

it triggers a judge’s inquiry into whether the lawyer is providing
effective assistance of counsel to the accused.114
In each of these instances, the trial judge is apprised of the fact that
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
may be in jeopardy. As discussed previously,115 in McMann v.
Richardson, the Supreme Court recognized that a trial judge has an
affirmative obligation not to leave the defendant “to the mercies of the
incompetent counsel.”116 Protecting the right to counsel requires a trial
judge to inquire into the possible threat to a defendant’s right to effective
assistance of counsel.117
A. Defendant’s Request for Substitute Counsel
In recent years, there has been some investigation into defendants
who choose to represent themselves rather than be represented by a
publicly provided lawyer.118 Researchers have found that comprehensive
data is lacking.119 There are, however, two studies that provide some
insight into pro se defendants. One, by Erica Hashimoto, is an empirical
study into pro se defendants in federal and state courts in which she
includes an examination of the reasons why some defendants choose to
represent themselves.120 Another empirical study, by Jona Goldschmidt
and Don Stemen, focuses on pro se defendants in federal courts and
examines trends in pro se representation.121
Due to limitations in the data, it is hard to say exactly how many
defendants choose to represent themselves, especially in state courts.122
114. See infra Part V.C.
115. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
116. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
117. For example, when a trial judge is aware that defense counsel may have a conflict of
interest, such as representing codefendants, the trial judge must inquire into the possible threat or
the defendant will be deprived of assistance of counsel. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484
(1978). When such a violation of the Sixth Amendment right occurs, reversal is automatic and no
showing of prejudice is required. Id. at 487-89.
118. See, e.g., Hashimoto, supra note 87, at 438-76.
119. Jona Goldschmidt & Don Stemen, Patterns and Trends in Federal Pro Se Defense, 19962011, FED. CTS. L. REV., June 2015, at 81, 84.
120. Hashimoto, supra note 87, at 429 (“[F]elony [pro se] defendants choose to represent
themselves because of legitimate concerns about, or dissatisfaction with, appointed counsel.”).
121. See, e.g., Goldschmidt & Stemen, supra note 119, at 84 (“Anyone working in the area of
research into pro se litigation knows that court data regarding the phenomenon is scant.”). State
court administrator offices do not report data on criminal pro se processing. Id. at 84-85. The
databases that do exist usually have high rates of missing data. Hashimoto, supra note 87, at 441-46.
122. Hashimoto explains that the state court database contains data on only a fraction of
criminal cases, and that fraction is not necessarily a representative fraction of felony cases in state
courts. Hashimoto, supra note 87, at 442 n.82. The state court database is comprised of a sampling
of cases from the seventy-five most populous counties, which excludes information on cases in
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In federal courts, Goldschmidt and Stemen found felony pro se
representation at a rate of more than 1 in 100 defendants in Georgia,123
and nearly 1 in 100 in Louisiana and Oklahoma.124 Hashimoto reported a
lower overall rate of pro se representation in federal and state courts, and
found that somewhere between 1 in 200 and 1 in 300 felony defendants
choose to represent themselves.125 An earlier Department of Justice
Study found that in state courts, sampled felony defendants proceeded
pro se at the rate of nearly 1 in 50 in the early 1990s.126
While the overall rate of defendants charged who proceed pro se
appears to be relatively low in most instances, it appears magnified when
viewed compared to the number of defendants who go to trial.
Hashimoto found that approximately sixty-six percent of the federal
felony pro se defendants went to trial, either before a judge or jury, 127
compared to the estimated overall rate of three percent of all federal
defendants going to trial.128
Hashimoto’s analysis of available data also dispels a popular belief
held by many judges, defense lawyers, and prosecutors that defendants
who proceed pro se have some type of mental illness.129 She notes that
one commentator who has written about pro se defendants begins his
article “with the adage that ‘he who represents himself has a fool for a
client,’” and assumes, without any empirical evidence, “that people who
represent themselves are either deeply misguided or mentally ill.”130 In

more rural counties. Id.
123. The frequency of federal felony defendants proceeding pro se in Georgia was 1.4% during
the period studied, 1996–2011. Goldschmidt & Stemen, supra note 119, at 96 tbl.5.
124. Federal felony defendants proceeded pro se in Louisiana and Oklahoma at the rate of
0.8% during 1996–2011. Id.
125. Hashimoto calculated the rate of self-representation in felony cases to be approximately
0.5% to 0.3%. Hashimoto, supra note 87, at 447.
126. The study analyzed data concerning type of counsel for felony defendants in state courts
from the seventy-five largest counties in 1992, and found that 1.7% of defendants proceeded pro se.
HARLOW, supra note 102, at 5 tbl.6.
127. Hashimoto, supra note 87, at 453. Hashimoto states that of 208 pro se defendants in the
federal court database, 137 went to trial. Id.
128. See, e.g., Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online tbl.5.22.2010, http://www.
albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2017) (showing a total of 87,418
guilty pleas out of 90,164 cases were not dismissed prior to disposition); see also Lafler v. Cooper,
566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (stating that 97% of federal cases and 94% of state cases are resolved
through pleas).
129. See Hashimoto, supra note 87, at 456-59.
130. Id. at 438 (quoting John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the
Foot: An Assessment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 SETON
HALL CONST. L.J. 483, 485 (1996)). Hashimoto is referring to an article by John F. Decker, which
argues that many defendants proceeding pro se are foolish or “so totally out of touch with reality
that they believe they can do it all themselves.” Decker, supra, at 487.
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contrast to this belief held by many in the criminal justice system,131
Hashimoto’s analysis of the empirical evidence that does exist
demonstrates that “the vast majority of felony pro se defendants in
federal court do not exhibit overt signs of mental illness.”132 The lack of
data prevented Hashimoto from drawing any conclusions about
defendants in state courts, but there are also no data to suggest that
defendants in state courts would exhibit any more or fewer signs of
mental illness.133
Although there were insufficient data to determine the reasons why
felony defendants in state courts proceeded pro se, Hashimoto found that
approximately half of the federal felony defendants who proceeded pro
se did so only after asking the court to appoint new counsel.134 She states
that “the data suggest that at least some defendants who represent
themselves do so because of dissatisfaction with counsel.”135 Federal
felony defendants with court-appointed counsel were also more likely to
terminate their court-appointed lawyers and to proceed pro se than
federal felony defendants on the whole.136 After analyzing the available
data, Hashimoto concluded:
Because indigent defendants with court-appointed counsel are the very
people who are at risk of being confronted with choosing between
inept counsel and self-representation, the fact that pro se defendants
are more likely to be indigent tends to support the argument that
defendants choose to represent themselves because of concerns about
court-appointed counsel.137

Rather than assuming defendants expressing dissatisfaction with
their appointed counsel is rooted in some form of mental illness or is
misguided, trial judges should take these complaints more seriously. As
discussed previously, problems with public defense are well-known.138
131. See Hashimoto, supra note 87, at 434-35.
132. Id. at 428. Hashimoto found that of the more than 200 felony pro se defendants in federal
court whose cases she reviewed for her article, judges ordered competency exams in just over
twenty percent of the cases. Id. She explains that a federal district court judge will usually order a
competency evaluation when a defendant manifests a sign of mental illness. Id. She concludes that
the fact that no such examinations were ordered in close to eighty percent of cases “strongly
suggests that the vast majority of these defendants did not exhibit signs of mental illness.” Id.
133. Id. at 441-42.
134. Id. at 429.
135. Id. at 455.
136. Id. at 429. Goldschmidt and Stemen found a lower rate of federal felony defendants
proceeding pro se after terminating counsel than Hashimoto’s study, but Goldschmidt and Stemen
did not examine whether the defendants proceeded pro se after having first requested substitute
counsel. Goldschmidt & Stemen, supra note 119, at 99-100.
137. Hashimoto, supra note 87, at 466.
138. See supra Part III.
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By taking requests for substitute counsel and other complaints about
publicly provided counsel seriously, trial judges will be fulfilling their
duty to do justice. The type of inquiry they should conduct, as well as
the standards for determining ineffective assistance of counsel prior to
plea or trial, are discussed later in this Article.139
B. Excessive Caseloads
Defense counsel carrying an excessive caseload can also trigger a
judge’s duty to inquire into whether the lawyer is providing effective
assistance of counsel.140 The issue of excessive caseload may be raised
by the lawyer or public defender office, or it may be raised by a judge
who is aware that the caseloads of public defenders, appointed counsel,
or lawyers with public defense contracts exceed acceptable caseload
limits.141 When a lawyer is overburdened by excessive caseloads, the
lawyer will not have the time to represent a client effectively as required
by the Sixth Amendment.142
Excessive caseloads also trigger ethical concerns. In every
jurisdiction, a lawyer is expected to provide competent representation.143
The ethics rules also provide that “[a] lawyer’s work load must be
controlled so that each matter can be handled competently.”144 When a
lawyer has so many clients that her “representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to
another client,” a conflict of interest exists.145
The issue of excessive caseloads is so acute that the ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility recognized the
problem and issued an ethics opinion addressing the responsibilities of
defense lawyers with excessive caseloads.146 The opinion includes
language stating: “If a lawyer believes that her workload is such that she
is unable to meet the basic ethical obligations required of her in the
139. See infra Part VI.
140. See Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 277 (Fla. 2013).
141. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (discussing caseload limits).
142. Bright & Sanneh, supra note 61, at 2166.
143. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, upon which states model their own
ethics rules, provides in the first ethics rule: “A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2016).
144. Id. r. 1.3 cmt. 2.
145. Id. r. 1.7(a)(2); see In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial
Circuit Pub. Def., 561 So. 2d 1130, 1135 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam) (“When excessive caseload forces
the public defender to choose between the rights of the various indigent criminal defendants he
represents, a conflict of interest is inevitably created.”).
146. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 (2006).
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representation of a client, she must not continue the representation of
that client or, if representation has not yet begun, she must decline the
representation.”147 Courts addressing this issue, as well as state ethics
opinions, share the ABA’s view that a lawyer with an excessive caseload
must decline to accept new cases and, if the representation has already
begun, seek relief from the trial court.148
An example of a trial court doing this occurred in Florida in
2009.149 An Assistant Public Defender, Jay Kolsky, assigned to represent
Antoine Bowens, sought to withdraw from the case due to his excessive
caseload of 164 pending felonies.150 Bowens was “facing a first-degree
felony charge” and a potential “life sentence as a habitual offender.”151
The trial court found:
Kolsky had been able to do virtually nothing in preparation of Bowens’
defense, had not obtained a list of defense witnesses from Bowens, had
not taken any depositions, had not visited the scene of the alleged
crime, had not looked for defense witnesses or interviewed any, had
not prepared a mitigation package, had not filed any motions, and had
to request a continuance at the calendar call.152

There was also expert testimony that the excessive caseload leading to
Kolsky’s inability to represent Bowens properly was prejudicing
Bowens, and the trial court found that Bowens’s constitutional rights had
been prejudiced and granted Kolsky’s motion to withdraw.153
An earlier example of a trial judge considering the issue of the
effect of excessive caseloads on a defendant’s constitutional rights led to
the Louisiana Supreme Court decision, State v. Peart.154 An Orleans
Parish trial court appointed Rick Teissier, one of two public defenders in
Orleans Parish, to represent Leonard Peart on the charges of armed
robbery, aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, and attempted armed
robbery.155 Tessier filed a motion seeking relief due to his excessive
caseload.156 The trial court held a hearing, and at the hearing the court
found that “between January 1 and August 1, 1991, Teissier represented
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Joy, supra note 95, at 217-19 & nn.74-85 (identifying state ethics opinions and
court cases addressing the ethical obligations of publicly provided lawyers with excessive
caseloads).
149. State v. Bowens, 39 So. 3d 479, 480-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 275 (Fla. 2013).
153. Id.
154. 621 So. 2d 780, 784-85 (La. 1993).
155. Id. at 784.
156. Id.
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418 defendants. Of these, he entered 130 guilty pleas at arraignment. He
had at least one serious case set for trial for every trial date during that
period.”157 The Louisiana Supreme Court found that, due to excessive
caseloads and lack of support for Teissier and the other public defender
in Orleans Parish, clients of the public defenders were “generally not
provided with the effective assistance of counsel.”158 As a remedy, the
court created a rebuttable presumption that indigent defendants were not
receiving effective assistance of counsel, and required the state to prove
that defense counsel was effective before that judge could permit a case
to proceed to trial.159
When a publicly provided defense lawyer raises the issue of
excessive caseload either preventing the lawyer from taking on a new
case assignment or negatively affecting the representation of a current
client, a trial judge’s duty to do justice requires the trial judge to
consider the claims seriously, hold a hearing, and determine whether the
defendant is entitled to relief.160 If the representation has not yet begun,
the relief may be permitting the defense lawyer to decline taking the
case.161 If the representation has already begun, the relief may be
permitting the lawyer to withdraw and to appoint another lawyer with a
manageable caseload who is able to represent all clients effectively.162
C. Judge’s Own Inquiry Based on Ineffective
Representation Prior to Trial
At times, the poor performance of a defense lawyer may trigger a
judge to conduct an inquiry of defense counsel to ensure that the accused
has effective assistance of counsel.163 Such an inquiry by the judge
acting on her own initiative and not responding to a complaint by the
defendant, or by the request of an overburdened defense lawyer, should
be rare, but there are times when such an inquiry will be necessary.164
One such inquiry occurred in 2016, when a Wisconsin trial judge
removed the defense lawyer representing a man accused of first-degree
157. Id. (footnote omitted).
158. Id. at 790.
159. Id. at 791.
160. See infra Part VI.
161. See Peart, 621 So. 2d at 784, 787.
162. See Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 270 (Fla. 2013).
163. See United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407, 427 (3d Cir. 1953); Monroe v.
United States, 389 A.2d 811, 816 (D.C. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978).
164. See Schwarzer, supra note 13, at 639 (“When it appears in the course of litigation that a
lawyer’s performance is falling short, it should be the trial judge’s responsibility, as the person
responsible for the manner in which justice is administered in his court, to take appropriate
action.”).
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murder.165 At a pretrial hearing approximately a month before the
scheduled trial date, the judge became concerned when the defense
counsel “didn’t understand what was meant by certain legal terms and
concepts,” and gave incorrect answers to questions about various
evidentiary and procedural matters such as the admissibility of various
types of evidence and presenting an alibi defense.166 The trial judge also
found that the defense lawyer had not met with her client.167 The judge
cited to several Wisconsin ethics rules including lack of competence,
failing to represent her client diligently, and failing to communicate with
him.168 In the face of such poor performance, the trial judge found the
lawyer “grossly incompetent” and removed the lawyer from the case.169
As the case from Wisconsin demonstrates, there are times when a
trial judge committed to doing justice should intervene and remove
defense counsel who is not providing effective assistance. The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a trial judge should intervene
when there is “gross incompetence or faithlessness of counsel as should
be apparent to the trial judge,”170 and the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals has stated “that, the trial court also has the duty to ensure that
the assistance thereby rendered to an accused comports with at least the
minimum level of competence consistent with our standards of the fair
administration of justice.”171 When faced with obvious evidence of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a judge’s duty to do justice should
trigger an inquiry.
At the same time that there may be instances when a trial judge
should intervene sua sponte; it should only occur when the record is
sufficient to demonstrate that the trial counsel is not providing effective
assistance of counsel. There is a history of some trial judges who use
their discretion to intervene to penalize a lawyer the judge does not like,
to influence the verdict, or perhaps to undermine the defense lawyer’s
relationship with the client.172 Bennett Gershman has discussed how
some trial judges can, and do, use the judge’s broad discretion to
165. Ed Treleven, Murder Trial Postponed After Judge Removes Defense Attorney for Being
‘Grossly Incompetent’, WIS. ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2016), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/crimeand-courts/murder-trial-postponed-after-judge-removes-defense-attorney-for-being/article_05160c1
1-7ccb-5de8-a743-9fce298d50d4.html.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407, 427 (3d Cir. 1953).
171. Monroe v. United States, 389 A.2d 811, 816 (D.C. App. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1006 (1978).
172. Bennett L. Gershman, Judicial Interference with Effective Assistance of Counsel, 31 PACE
L. REV. 560, 568-71 (2011).
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administer justice to interfere with effective assistance of counsel.173
Gershman cites to several cases where trial judges have impaired the
ability of defense counsel to represent their clients effectively by
hindering the defense through actions such as restricting examination of
the defendant, limiting the number of witnesses the defense can call,
limiting defense counsel’s access to witnesses, imposing time limits on
the defendant’s direct testimony, taking over the examination of
witnesses, demeaning defense counsel before the jury, and interfering
with the defendant’s ability to consult with counsel.174 By requiring a
trial judge to make a record of the defense counsel’s ineffectiveness, a
similar misuse of a judge’s discretion to administer justice is unlikely to
occur when it comes to requiring effective assistance of counsel.175 As
stated at the outset, I anticipate that most interventions by trial judges
will be triggered by defendants’ complaints or overburdened defense
counsel raising the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel with
the court.176
Another possible way to help ensure that the inquiry into
ineffectiveness of counsel initiated by a trial judge is handled fairly
would be to have a different trial judge review the record and conduct
the hearing. A different judge could be requested by the original trial
judge recusing herself on this issue, a request by the defendant, or a
request by defense counsel.177 Using a second judge would be similar to
the procedure used in contempt hearings where a judge’s impartiality
might objectively be questioned.178 Another analog is the federal recusal
law, which requires a federal judge to “disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”179
In considering the federal law, the Supreme Court stated that “what
matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance.”180 In an
abundance of caution, a trial judge who is confronted with a defense
173. Id.
174. Id. at 565-74.
175. People v. Mendez, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 162, 167 (Ct. App. 2008).
176. See supra Part V.A–B.
177. Although a trial judge would not be required to recuse herself, if the judge believes that
her impartiality may be reasonably questioned, then there is support for the principle that the judge
should recuse or disqualify herself from conducting the hearing. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT r. 2.11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007) (“A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any
proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .”).
178. When there is a question of the judge’s impartiality in a contempt proceeding, the
Supreme Court has stated that it is appropriate for another judge to preside over the contempt
proceeding. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14-15 (1954) (quoting Cooke v. United States, 267
U.S. 517, 539 (1925)).
179. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012).
180. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994).
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lawyer who appears to be ineffective to the point that the judge raises the
issue sua sponte, the trial judge may ask a second judge to review the
record and conduct the hearing.181
VI.

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL HEARINGS

When the effectiveness of counsel is raised at the trial stage, there
are two basic questions. First, what is the nature of the hearing
required?182 Second, what standard should the trial judge apply in
evaluating whether there is ineffective assistance of counsel?183
A. Nature of the Hearing
A trial judge has a great deal of discretion in considering a
defendant’s request for substitute counsel prior to trial. State and
federal courts use an abuse of discretion standard, 184 which means that
a trial judge’s decision to deny a request for substitute counsel will not
be reversed unless it was arbitrary or capricious or exceeds the bound
of law or reason.185 Having such broad discretion, some trial judges
give complaints about appointed counsel short shrift and deny an
indigent defendant’s request for substitute counsel without making a
serious inquiry into the complaints.186
181. The Court has stated that a trial judge considering holding a lawyer in contempt “may,
without flinching from his duty, properly ask that one of his fellow judges take his place.” Offutt,
348 U.S. at 14-15 (quoting Cooke, 267 U.S. at 539). Similarly, a trial judge who has concerns about
a defense lawyer rendering effective assistance of counsel may call upon a judge not otherwise
involved in a case to consider the matter.
182. See infra Part VI.A.
183. See infra Part VI.B.
184. See, e.g., United States v. Burgos, 539 F.3d 641, 645-46 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he district
court has substantial discretion on requests for substitute appointed counsel, and we review the
court’s decision only for an abuse of that discretion.”); Cox v. State, 489 So. 2d 612, 622 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1985) (ruling on motion for substitution of counsel is within the discretion of the trial
judge and abuse of discretion is the standard on review); State v. Paris-Sheldon, 154 P.3d 1046,
1050 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (“[R]eview[ing] a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s request for
substitute counsel for a clear abuse of discretion.”); People v. Yascavage, 80 P.3d 899, 903 (Colo.
App. 2003), aff’d, 101 P.3d 1090 (Colo. 2004) (holding that the trial court’s ruling on a motion for
substitution of counsel is reviewed under the standard of abuse of discretion); State v. Turner, 37
A.3d 183, 190 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012) (stating the courts review refusal to appoint new counsel for
abuse of discretion); State v. Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d 744, 749-50 (Iowa 2004) (holding that standard of
review is abuse of discretion).
185. See, e.g., State v. Jasper, 8 P.3d 708, 711-12 (Kan. 2000) (upholding the trial court’s
decision denying substitution of counsel and explaining abuse of discretion as follows: “Judicial
discretion is abused when judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another
way of saying that discretion is abused only when no reasonable person would take the view
adopted by the trial court”).
186. Simply listening to the defendant’s request, has been found to be sufficient. See, e.g.,
State v. Smith, 123 P.3d 261, 267 (Or. 2005) (holding that a trial court does not have “an affirmative
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Although some trial judges may not take the request for
substitution of counsel or other complaints about publicly provided
lawyers seriously, in federal courts “all Circuits agree, courts cannot
properly resolve substitution motions without probing why a defendant
wants a new lawyer.”187 This requires an on-the-record hearing and the
trial judge to inquire into the defendant’s allegations sufficient to
“permit[] meaningful appellate review” of the trial court’s exercise of
discretion.188 State courts generally follow this same requirement, 189
though some states have held that that the inquiry may be limited or
brief,190 or that the nature of the hearing depends on the form of the
defendant’s complaints.191
While there is a divergence among courts about the nature of the
hearing that is required when there is a request for substitution of
counsel, some states have developed clear minimum guidelines. 192 For
example, a defendant requesting substitution of counsel in California
is entitled to a Marsden Hearing,193 which is based on a line
of cases following People v. Marsden.194 In People v. Mendez, a
California appellate court summarized the four requirements of a
Marsden hearing:
First, if [a] “defendant complains about the adequacy of appointed
counsel,” the trial court has a duty to “permit [the defendant] to
articulate his [or her] causes of dissatisfaction and, if any of them

duty to conduct an inquiry and make a factual assessment in response to a defendant’s complaints
about appointed counsel”). There is little data on the number of requests for new counsel and how
often those requests are granted. See Hashimoto, supra note 87, at 460-61. In my experience, judges
are usually reluctant to grant such requests, and, as Erica Hashimoto’s analysis of the federal
docketing database indicates, “some judges, upon granting a motion for appointment of new
counsel, will admonish the defendant that she will not entertain any further such motions.” Id. at
461-62 n.145. The admonishments Hashimoto notes suggest that judges are not prepared to consider
valid requests for substitute counsel a second time.
187. Martel v. Clair, 565 U.S. 648, 664 (2012).
188. Id. (quoting United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 336-37 (1988)).
189. See Cox, 489 So. 2d at 622; State v. Munt, 831 N.W.2d 569, 586 (Minn. 2013).
190. See, e.g., People v. Porto, 942 N.E.2d 283, 287 (N.Y. 2010) (holding that a court “must
make at least a minimal inquiry” into a request for substitute counsel).
191. See, e.g., State v. Hernandez, 305 P.3d 378, 383 (Ariz. 2013) (holding that generalized
complaints may not require a formal hearing), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1283 (2014); State v. Smith,
123 P.3d 261, 267 (Or. 2005) (holding that not all complaints about counsel require the trial court to
inquire and make a factual assessment); Snow v. State, 270 P.3d 656, 659 (Wyo. 2012) (holding that
if the reasons stated on the record are not good cause for substitution the court is not required to
inquire into the reasons).
192. See People v. Mendez, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 162, 166-67 (Ct. App. 2008).
193. See id.
194. 465 P.2d 44 (Cal. 1970).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 9

166

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:139

suggest ineffective assistance, to conduct an inquiry sufficient to
ascertain whether counsel is in fact rendering effective assistance.”
....
Second, if “a defendant states facts sufficient to raise a question about
counsel’s effectiveness,” the trial court has a duty to “question counsel
as necessary to ascertain their veracity.”
....
Third, the trial court has the duty to “make a record sufficient to show
the nature of [a defendant]’s grievances and the court’s response
to them.”
....
Fourth, the trial court must “allow the defendant to express any
specific complaints about the attorney and the attorney [is] to
respond accordingly.”195

The Marsden Hearing requirements demonstrate that for a hearing
to be meaningful it has to be sufficient for the trial judge to make a
well-reasoned and informed decision whether to request a change of
counsel, and a sufficient record has to be developed so that the
decision may be reviewed on appeal.196 States that do not have similar,
clearly defined expectations for trial judges considering motions for
substitution of counsel should adopt a protocol similar to the Marsden
Hearing in order to guarantee fundamental due process for the accused.
Without an opportunity to state for the record the reasons for a request
for new counsel, and without defense counsel having the opportunity to
respond, a defendant’s request is not given serious consideration.
Similarly, when defense counsel raises with the court an issue
about counsel’s ability to provide effective assistance of counsel, or
when the court itself raises this concern, a hearing similar to a Marsden
Hearing should take place. It is essential for the trial judge to consider
the issues raised thoroughly and completely, and the trial judge must
make a good record to support whatever decision is made.
B. Standard to Apply
When an issue of adequacy of counsel is raised at the trial level, the
trial judge should consider the claim of ineffectiveness as a basic denial
of counsel under Gideon, and not ineffectiveness of counsel under
Strickland, which would first require conviction.197 The basic denial of
195. Mendez, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 166-67 (quoting People v. Eastman, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 922,
927-28 (Ct. App. 2007)).
196. See id.
197. See, e.g., Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 278 (Fla.
2013) (finding excessive caseloads “involve some measure of non-representation and therefore a
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counsel occurs not only when counsel is not provided at a critical stage
of a case such as at arraignment,198 but also when counsel has been
appointed but is unavailable to their clients, unresponsive to their
clients’ requests, waives their clients’ important rights without their
clients’ consent, or “ultimately appeared to do little more on their
[clients’] behalf than act as conduits for plea offers.”199 A denial of
actual assistance of counsel also occurs when excessive caseloads lead to
defense counsel engaging in “meet and greet pleas,” failing to
adequately investigate cases, and often being unprepared for trial.200
The effectiveness prong of Strickland commands that “[t]he proper
measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms,” and whether counsel’s assistance was
reasonable considering all of the circumstances.201 The Court in
Strickland then cited to the ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the
Defense Function202 as “[p]revailing norms of practice.”203 Using the
ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function as guidance in
evaluating claims for substitution of counsel or issues of effectiveness of
counsel raised by defense counsel or the court sua sponte prior to trial,
the trial judge should consider seriously issues such as: defense
counsel’s conflict of interest;204 excessive caseload;205 lack of diligence,
promptness and punctuality;206 failure to establish and maintain an
effective client relationship;207 failure to keep the defendant informed
denial of the actual assistance of counsel guaranteed by Gideon and the Sixth Amendment”);
Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 224-25 (N.Y. 2010) (finding Strickland inapplicable when
a complaint alleges the basic denial of counsel under Gideon); see also Emily Chiang, Indigent
Defense Invigorated: A Uniform Standard for Adjudicating Pre-Conviction Sixth Amendment
Claims, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 443, 460-64 (2010) (discussing several class actions
employing this litigation approach).
198. Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 223.
199. Id. at 222.
200. Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla., 115 So. 3d at 278.
201. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
202. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2015).
203. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
204. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 41.7; see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 483-84 (1978) (holding that a trial court’s failure to
ascertain whether an alleged conflict of interest required new counsel is a deprivation of “assistance
of counsel”).
205. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-1.8
(prohibiting defense counsel from carrying an excessive caseload).
206. Id. Standard 4-1.9 (requiring diligence, promptness, and punctuality in defense
representation). The Defense Function Standards also require defense counsel to take prompt and
thorough actions to protect clients, which involves promptly seeking and reviewing information
about the case and taking steps to have physical evidence preserved. Id. Standard 4-3.7.
207. Id. Standard 4-3.1 (setting expectations for defense counsel to establish and maintain an
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and advised about the representation;208 failing to conduct an adequate
investigation;209 compliance with discovery procedures;210 lack of
preparation for court proceedings;211 failure to advise the defendant of
collateral consequences;212 and failure to advise a defendant about plea
negotiations and offers.213 When there is a sufficient showing that
defense counsel is not providing effective assistance of counsel
measured against prevailing norms of practice, the trial judge should
arrange for new counsel.
Trial judges should also take some guidance from instances of
ineffectiveness that have survived a post-trial analysis under Strickland.
Gershman has identified failing to investigate potential defenses as a
pervasive problem, and he cites a number of cases in which courts have
found ineffective assistance of counsel on that basis.214 In a trio
of cases from 2010 through 2012, the Supreme Court has also found
that defense counsel’s bad advice to turn down a plea offer;215 failure
to advise a client of the collateral consequence of deportation;216
and failure to communicate plea offers are all ineffective assistance
of counsel.217
The Supreme Courts of Louisiana and Florida have considered the
value of a trial court considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel
prior to trial, and both have concluded that it is appropriate and
necessary.218 The Louisiana Supreme Court stated: “If the trial court has
sufficient information before trial, the judge can most efficiently inquire
into any inadequacy and attempt to remedy it.”219 In endorsing this
effective client relationship).
208. Id. Standard 4-3.9 (requiring defense counsel to keep client informed and advised about
developments and progress in the representation).
209. Id. Standard 4-4.1 (defining defense counsel’s obligation to investigate in all cases and to
engage investigators when necessary).
210. Id. Standard 4-4.5 (requiring defense counsel to comply with discovery procedures).
211. Id. Standard 4-4.6 (requiring adequate preparation for all court proceedings).
212. Defense counsel has an obligation to advise the client of collateral consequences, id.
Standard 4-5.4, and must give special attention to immigration status and consequences, id.
Standard 4-5.5.
213. Defense counsel also has various duties concerning negotiations around possible pleas.
See id. Standard 4-6.1 (explaining the duty to explore disposition without trial); id. Standard 4-6.2
(explaining the duty to engage in and keep client informed of negotiated disposition discussions); id.
Standard 4-6.3 (explaining duties about pleas agreements and other negotiated dispositions).
214. BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, CRIMINAL TRIAL ERROR AND MISCONDUCT § 3-3(b)(1) & n.150
(3d ed. 2015).
215. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162-70 (2012).
216. Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. 356, 365-74 (2010).
217. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133, 145 (2012).
218. See Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 277 (Fla. 2013);
State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 787 (La. 1993).
219. Peart, 621 So. 2d at 787.
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approach, the Florida Supreme Court agreed with the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s reasoning that “this approach furthers judicial economy, protects
defendants’ constitutional rights, and preserves the integrity of the
trial process.”220
VII.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning the rights of
indigent defendants, which makes it clear that they do not have the
right either to choose their lawyer, or to a meaningful relationship with
their assigned lawyers,221 fosters presumptions against taking effective
assistance of counsel seriously, especially when concerns are voiced by
indigent defendants prior to trial. It also leads trial judges to accept
excessive caseloads on the part of public provided counsel, even when
those excessive caseloads undermine a lawyer’s ability to provide
effective, ethical representation to each client. By failing to take a
defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel seriously, a trial
judge also fails to discharge the judge’s duty to do justice and denies
the accused’s right to a fair trial.
More than forty years ago, Chief Judge Bazelon articulated the
best argument for trial judges to become actively involved in ensuring
effective assistance of counsel:
The real battle for equal justice, however, must be waged in the
trenches of the trial courts. Although reversing criminal convictions
can have a significant deterrent effect, an appellate court necessarily
depends upon the trial courts to implement the standards it announces.
No amount of rhetoric from appellate courts can assure indigent
defendants effective representation unless trial judges—and ultimately
defense counsel themselves—fulfill their responsibilities.222

Although the current state of the law does not guarantee an indigent
defendant choice of counsel, it still promises every defendant effective
assistance of counsel.223 As Chief Judge Bazelon argued, our society can
come closer to fulfilling that obligation if each trial judge takes the
accused’s rights seriously and fulfills the judge’s duty to do justice by
ensuring the accused’s right to the effective assistance of counsel.224
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224.

Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla., 115 So. 3d at 277.
See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 296 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970); supra note 106 and accompanying
See Decoster, 624 F.2d at 295-98 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
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